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Human infection with avian inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) virus 
raises concern for the possibility of a pandemic. We report 
20 cases, which ranged from asymptomatic to fatal, in 
Pakistan in 2007. These cases indicate human-to-human-
to-human transmission of this virus, and the number of 
cases may be higher than realized.
E
vidence of human-to-human transmission of inﬂ  uenza 
A (H5N1) virus raises concern over a possible pandemic 
(1). Previous epidemiologic investigation of the outbreak of 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) among persons in the Northwest Frontier 
Province of Pakistan (Figure 1) in 2007 found 5 cases—3 
conﬁ  rmed, 1 asymptomatic, and 1 probable—as deﬁ  ned 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) (2). We report 
a larger set of 20 cases during this outbreak in Pakistan, 
supporting human-to-human-to-human transmission. 
The Cases 
Records were examined from all hospitals that treated 
patients with inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) virus in Northwest Frontier 
Province during 2007. Data were rendered anonymous and 
entered into a secure database with predetermined clinical 
and epidemiologic ﬁ   elds. Cases matching predeﬁ  ned 
criteria (Table 1) were classiﬁ  ed as laboratory conﬁ  rmed, 
likely, or possible. Cases not meeting classiﬁ  cation criteria 
were excluded. We slightly modiﬁ   ed WHO criteria to 
resemble criteria that clinicians might adopt during an 
actual outbreak, especially in a resource-poor setting (3).
We identiﬁ   ed 20 cases—4 laboratory conﬁ  rmed, 
7 likely, and 9 possible—resulting in a ratio of 4 likely/
possible cases for each laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case. Median 
age was 29 years (range 7–60 years) for all patients and 30 
years (range 23–35 years) for conﬁ  rmed case-patients; 16 
(80%) patients were male. The infecting exposure could not 
be established for all patients because multiple exposures, 
human and avian, were recorded for some. Of the 4 
patients with laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases, 3 were treated 
with oseltamivir (2 [67%] of whom survived), and 1 had 
asymptomatic disease and received no antiviral treatment.
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Figure 1. Areas of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) cases in humans, Pakistan, 
2007. Red shading indicates districts that reported suspected 
human cases of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1). Light brown shading indicates 
Northwest Frontier Province. Source: World Health Organization 
(WHO). Districts of avian inﬂ  uenza suspected cases in Northwest 
Frontier Province, Pakistan. WHO map no. WHO-PAK-002 (www.
whopak.org/disaster).
Table 1. Case classification definitions used to diagnose 
influenza (H5N1) infection in humans, Pakistan, 2007* 
Classification Definition
Laboratory 
confirmed
Laboratory confirmation of influenza (H5N1) 
virus at local/regional or World Health 
Organization confirmatory laboratory 
Likely
  Definition 1  Epidemiologically linked by time, place, and 
exposure to a likely or confirmed human or 
avian influenza (H5N1) case AND 
Equivocal test OR positive laboratory 
confirmation of an influenza A virus infection 
but insufficient laboratory evidence for 
influenza (H5N1) virus infection AND 
Clinical signs or symptoms consistent with 
disease (regardless of severity): fever or flu-
like 
  Definition 2  Epidemiologically linked by time, place, and 
exposure to a likely or confirmed influenza 
(H5N1) case-patient AND 
Death due to unexplained acute respiratory 
illness AND 
Negative test/test not performed 
Possible  Epidemiologically linked by time, place and 
exposure to a likely or confirmed human or 
avian influenza (H5N1) case AND 
Test not performed/negative test AND 
Clinical signs and symptoms consistent with 
disease (regardless of severity): fever or flu-
like 
Noncase Confirmed positive for non-H5N1 influenza A 
virus subtype OR 
Patient condition determined to have etiology 
other than avian influenza Human Infection with Avian Inﬂ  uenza Virus, Pakistan, 2007
Signs and symptoms were mainly those of a febrile 
inﬂ   uenza-like illness (Table 2), although 1 patient 
with a laboratory-conﬁ   rmed case was asymptomatic 
(microneutralization titer 320, Western blot positive, throat 
swab positive for H5 by reverse transcription–PCR); this 
case-patient was also described in a previous epidemiologic 
investigation (2). Gastrointestinal signs and symptoms were 
not prominent, and neurologic signs were not reported.
The ﬁ  rst 8 cases constituted a cluster (Figure 2). The 
index case-patient (patient 1) had culled inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
virus–infected poultry. After becoming febrile (38°C) 
while in Abbottabad, he traveled by public transportation 
to his family home in Peshawar. His illness progressed 
and on November 5, 2007, he was admitted to Khyber 
Teaching Hospital, where the diagnosis of inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) infection was made. Infection appeared to spread 
initially from household family contacts (patients 2–6) to 
medical staff (patient 7, who had positive PCR but negative 
microneutralization test results) and to a frequent visitor to 
the intensive care unit (patient 8). 
As previously noted (2), the extended period from 
the time persons were exposed to the index case-patient, 
during which family members became ill, points to human-
to-human-to-human transmission; patient 2 probably 
accounted for intermediary or second-generation infection. 
The chain of infection illustrated in Figure 2 suggests that 
further human-to-human-to-human transmission might 
have occurred and suggests nosocomial transmission. Of 
note, patient 6 (a cousin of the index case-patient) had a 
microneutralization titer of 80 but a negative Western 
blot result. Although 4 contacts of patient 6 exhibited no 
signs or symptoms of inﬂ  uenza, they did have positive H5 
microneutralization titers ranging from 80 to 160.
No evidence epidemiologically links the remaining 
12 patients to the 8 patients in the cluster; each of the 12 
either had direct contact with inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) virus–
infected poultry or was near healthy or diseased poultry 
before symptom onset. Three patients worked on poultry 
farms: 1 had taken a sample from an inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
virus–infected chicken, 1 was directly involved in culling, 
and 1 was indirectly exposed to live poultry. Eight patients 
had negative test results for inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) virus, and 3 
had positive results from the National Institute of Health 
Islamabad but negative conﬁ  rmatory-testing results from 
WHO; 1 patient died before samples could be taken. 
Different laboratories reported conﬂ   icting results with 
respect to conﬁ   rmation of infection, possibly because 
of the difﬁ  culties of complying with specimen-handling 
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Table 2. Clinical characteristics for persons with reported cases of influenza (H5N1), Pakistan, 2007 
Clinical sign or symptom 
Diagnostic certainty, no./total (%)  
Laboratory confirmed  Likely   Possible  
Respiratory  
  Abnormal breath sounds (wheezing, rales,  
 stridor,  rhonchi) 
1/2 (50)  1/5 (20)  2/5 (40) 
  Excessive sputum production  0/1 (0)  0/4 (0)  2/6 (33) 
  Rhinorrhea/nasal discharge  1/2 (50)  1/4 (25)  1/5 (20) 
  Unexplained respiratory illness with cough,  
  shortness of breath, or difficulty breathing 
1/3 (33)  4/7 (57)  7/9 (78) 
  Sore throat/pharyngitis  1/1 (100)  0/4 (0)  3/6 (50) 
  Tachypnea  0/2 (0)  1/5 (20)  1/5 (20) 
  Cyanosis  0/1 (0)  0/4 (0)  1/3 (33) 
  Chest pain  2/2 (100)  1/1 (100)  3/5 (60) 
  Pleural effusion  0 0 1/3 (33) 
 Hemoptysis  0 0 1/1  (100) 
 Orthopnea  0 0 0  (0) 
Gastrointestinal  
  Diarrhea  0/1 (0)  1/4 (25)  2/5 (40) 
 Abdominal  pain  0 0 0
  Vomiting  0/4 (0)  0/7 (0)  1/9 (11) 
  Rectal bleeding  0 0 0/1 (0) 
Other
  Fever  3/4 (75)  7/7 (100)  6/9 (89) 
  Headache  2/3 (67)  2/4 (50)  2/5 (40) 
  Body aches  1/1 (100)  0 1/1 (100) 
 Backache  0 0 1/1  (100) 
  Pericardial effusion  0 0 0/1 (0) 
  Nonpitting pedal edema  0 0 0/1 (0) 
  Fatigue or malaise  0/4 (75)  0/7 (0)  1/9 (11) 
  Myalgia  0/1 (0)  1/3 (33)  2/4 (50) 
 Tachycardia  0 1/1  (100)  0requirements in resource-poor settings. Clinical details of 
these cases are shown in Table 2.
Conclusions
The preponderance of male patients is probably 
explained by sociocultural factors; the index case-patient 
was a poultry culler, a male-dominated task, and shared 
accommodation with male family members. Health care–
seeking behavior may also account for this ﬁ  nding.
The human-to-human transmission from the index case-
patient to at least some household contacts seems clear, and 
the extended period over which these contacts became ill 
supports subsequent human-to-human transmission. Figure 
2 supports the conclusion that patient 2 initiated a chain of 
infection in which further human-to-human transmission to 
patients 7 and 8 occurred. Possible nosocomial transmission 
is of concern because full implementation of isolation 
procedures in resource-poor settings may be problematic.
Although virologically supported probable human-
to-human transmission of inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) virus has 
been documented, it has been thought to occur only with 
prolonged and close contact (4). Household clustering 
and the difﬁ   culty of establishing exact virus exposures 
have encumbered efforts to investigate possible human-
to-human transmission (5). Modeling has (6) suggested 
human-to-human transmission in Indonesia, but the utility 
of statistical modeling unsupported by ﬁ  eld data has been 
questioned (7).
Although the index case-patient traveled by public 
transportation from Abbottabad, where he acquired his 
infection, no infections were reported for anyone other than 
household contacts, who were all related and exposed at 
his family home at Peshawar. In contrast, patients 2 and 6 
might have spread infection through less intimate contact, 
which raises 2 questions. Might some persons shed virus 
more efﬁ  ciently than others, possibly in greater quantity? 
And what role might host factors play in susceptibility to 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) virus infection and disease? A degree 
of virus adaptation to humans might also have occurred, 
although absence of sustained community transmission 
argues against this possibility.
Of concern is the 4:1 ratio of likely/possible to 
laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases, suggesting that ofﬁ  cial tallies 
understate true incidence of infection. Factors that may 
contribute to undercounting are the difﬁ  culty of obtaining 
virologic conﬁ   rmation or of storing and transporting 
samples in resource-poor settings and reluctance by 
relatives to consent to autopsy. Another reason to 
believe that less fulminant cases may go unreported is 
the occurrence in Pakistan, and elsewhere, of clinically 
mild and asymptomatic cases (5,8–14), indicating that 
inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) virus may cause a spectrum of illness. 
The demonstration during the 1997 Hong Kong outbreak 
of inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) with seroconversion in apparently 
asymptomatic health care workers and social contacts 
suggests human-to-human transmission, although in 
Hanoi, no transmission to health care workers was detected 
(8,13,15). Also contributing to underreporting are the 
predominant clinical signs of undifferentiated inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness observed in Pakistan and elsewhere, which, unless 
clinical deterioration occurred, would be unremarkable 
in many tropical settings. Although the survival rate was 
greater for patients who received oseltamivir, the small 
number of patients and the inclusion of those with mild 
and asymptomatic illness prevent meaningful statistical 
comparison. 
Several features of the outbreak are unusual or give cause 
for concern: human-to-human-to-human transmission, 
possible nosocomial transmission, occurrence of mild 
and asymptomatic cases, and difﬁ  culties of establishing 
laboratory conﬁ  rmation of likely and possible cases (which 
also prevented genotypic matching of specimens from 
primary and putative secondary cases). Taken together, 
these features suggest that current surveillance might 
undercount the extent of human infection with inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) virus and that human-to-human transmission might 
possibly be associated with less severe disease.
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Figure 2. Path of infection of inﬂ   uenza (H5N1), Pakistan, 
2007. During October 22–30, patient 1 worked culling infected 
chickens; on November 2, he moved home and had contact with 
4 brothers (patients 2–5) and possibly a cousin (patient 6). He was 
hospitalized on November 5 and transferred to an intensive care 
unit the next day. His cousin cared for him and became patient 6; 
his attending doctor became patient 7. On November 23, patient 
3 was hospitalized and on November 28 was transferred to an 
intensive care unit; during this time, patient 8 frequently visited his 
wife in the same intensive care unit.Human Infection with Avian Inﬂ  uenza Virus, Pakistan, 2007
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